Research
Research
The Plurality of Laws of Nature. The Perspectival Best Systems Approach, Brill-De Gruyter, Series Title: History of Philosophy and Science, forthcoming
Perspectival realism seeks to reconcile the plurality of scientific practices with a commitment to scientific realism. This realist commitment holds that the entities, properties, and laws posited by science are mind-independent. The central challenge facing perspectival realism is to explain how such pluralism can be coherently reconciled with realism. In this book, I approach perspectival realism as a viable realist position within contemporary philosophy of science.
The book provides a critical analysis of what perspectival realism amounts to, arguing that it constitutes a spectrum of competing views: To make this spectrum explicit, he distinguishes pluralist views concerning models, representation, and truth from realist commitments concerning properties, laws of nature, and natural kinds.
Furthermore, I develop a novel account—the Perspectival Package Deal Account of Laws—inspired by Loewer’s Package Deal Account of laws and properties. Perspectival Package Deal Account offers a principled reconciliation by combining a historically pluralist understanding of packages of laws with a realist commitment to a mind-independent patterns. Unlike Barry Loewer’s original formulation, the Perspectival Package Deal Account rejects the ideal of an endpoint of scientific enquiry, embracing the perspectival realist plea for epistemic humility. Instead of an ideal God Eye’s perspective, there are many historically situated packages of laws.
Science in Perspective: Essays on Pluralism, Pragmatism, and the Diversity of Knowledge, Springer Cham, Series Title: Synthese Library, forthcoming (with Alexander Christian and Paul Hasselkuß)
“A Model-Exploratory Understanding of Newton’s Experimental Philosophy and of his Theories of Laws“ (forthcoming; with Markus Schrenk), in Metaphysics of Laws and Powers, edited by Vannesa Seifert, Stavros Ioannidis, and Stathis Psillos (Routledge Studies in Philosophy of Science), London: Routledge, https://philpapers.org/rec/BICAMU
This essay investigates Newton's thoughts on laws of nature. First, we argue that Newton’s experimental-philosophical methodology of hypotheses and queries exhibits a modal-exploratory nature. Second, this modal-exploratory character has immediate consequences for his metaphysics of laws of nature. In the introduction, we explain the main characteristics of modal-exploratory modelling as a modelling technique involving targetless models (i.e. non-existing entities; cf. Massimi 2019, 2022). In the second section, we show that Newton’s modelling of the cause of universal gravitation via his earlier (presented in his optical correspondences from 1675) and later aether models (presented in the Opticks of 1704 and 1717) are paradigmatic cases of modal-exploratory modelling. In the third and final section, we show further that also the context of Newton's metaphysics of laws/active principles from “Query 31” of the second edition of the Opticks (1717) can be seen as a case of modal-exploratory modelling. Recent commentators (e.g., Biener & Schliesser 2017, Henry 2020, Hazelwood 2023, Walsh 2017) remarked that Newton’s definition of active principles as laws, causes, natures, or dispositions gives rise to various conceptual tensions. However, we aim to show that the tension inherent in his conception of laws is merely apparent since he is wrestling with multiple possibilities of making a theory of laws work. According to our modal-exploratory reading, Newton attempts to find out a plausible contender for what laws of nature may be. Relative to our reading, his definition of active principles in terms of laws and dispositions should not be taken at face value, but seen as a “never-at-rest” exploratory activity. So, we will reach the conclusion that Newton's modelling procedure is an exploratory one, being situated at the intersection of philosophical- experimental methodology and his metaphysics of laws.
“How To Tame Abundance? Frigg’s User-Manual“ (forthcoming) in Frigg and His Critics, edited by Luz Seiberth and Leon Isenmann (Routledge Studies in Philosophy of Science), London: Routledge
Model pluralism pervades scientific practice (Veit, 2019), as multiple, often incompatible models are routinely employed to represent a single phenomenon—from nuclear physics (Morrison, 2011) to biology (Mitchell, 2020) and cognitive science (Chirimuuta, 2020, 2023). Roman Frigg (2022) calls this the "problem of abundance": the existence of multiple, empirically successful yet incompatible models of one target system, exemplified by nuclear physics, where liquid-drop, shell, and quark models endorse fundamentally different ontologies (Morrison, 2015). This paper examines whether perspectival realism offers a viable response, disentangling three interpretations: epistemic (Giere), ontic (Mitchell), and modal (Massimi). Giere's account treats models as partial and distorted perspectives (Giere, 2006), but merely redescribing inconsistency in perspectival terms fails to resolve it, as Frigg (2022) notes. Mitchell's ontic view manages pluralism through model integration across levels of analysis (Mitchell, 2009, 2020), yet this strategy does not generalise to cases like nuclear models, where no integrative procedure exists (Bica, forthcoming). Massimi's modal account, by contrast, reconceives models as "inferential blueprints" exploring physical conceivability rather than mapping actual states of affairs (Massimi, 2018, 2022). I argue this modal turn dissolves the apparent inconsistency, offering the most compelling perspectival realist solution to the problem of abundance.
"Navigating Massimi’s Perspectival Garden with Inferential Forking Paths", in International Studies in Philosophy of Science, Volume 35, 2023, Issue 3-4, https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2023.2191168
In this review article, I situate Michela Massimi’s 2022 Perspectival Realism book in the broader state of the art of the contemporary philosophy of science by examining critically its contribution to the perspectival realism debate. Setting up a new agenda of philosophical problems for the perspectival realist, Massimi’s book is the most comprehensive assessment of perspectival realism since the publication of Giere’s 2006 (the starting point of the debate). The author carries out a scrupulous analysis of the historical, epistemological, and metaphysical foundations of perspectival realism—while she engages critically with the existing literature, she does so by giving a generous homage to the previous contributions to the state of the art (the works of Giere, Morrison, van Fraassen and others). However, I raise a batterie of questions about Massimi’s (perspectival) commitments, to bring into question the reach and the ambitions of her global project, specifically the rising tension between her modest epistemological beliefs in a plurality of culturally and historically situated perspectives and her ambitious metaphysical commitments towards a primitivist view about laws of nature.
“Causal Powers in the Framework of the Early Modernity” in Journal of Early Modern Studies, vol.9 2021, 2: 141-150, https://doi.org/10.5840/jems20209216
“Thinking with Mechanisms. Mechanical Philosophy and Early Modern Science” in Journal of Early Modern Studies, vol.9 2020, 1: 133-141, https://doi.org/10.5840/jems2020916
"The Mismatch Problem is the Chief Challenge of the Best System Theorist"
"Perspectival About What?"
"The Safety Dilemma Put to The Test" (shared work with Isabelle Keßels & Paul Hasselkuß)
“Why the perspectival realist should be a Best System Theorist”
"Level Perspectivism. Many models, many levels"
“Levels and Scales of Hierarchical Organization”
“The Dependence and Autonomy Account of Scales”